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The prevention of crime is listed as the first objective 
of the South African Police Service (SAPS) in section 
204(3) of the South African Constitution.1 The 
adoption of a community policing model in 1995 
directed the emphasis of policing toward establishing 
‘partnerships’ with community bodies, thus 
developing collaborative crime prevention strategies. 
This required the SAPS to set up structured 
consultative forums – community policing forums 
(CPFs) – and cooperative relationships with a host of 
other community, public and government bodies.2
Given the role the police played in upholding the 
apartheid regime, especially in neighbourhoods 
such as Khayelitsha, the post-apartheid service has 
essentially had to build on a legitimacy deficit. The 
result has been that police legitimacy has come to 
be linked to police effectiveness.3 If effectiveness is 
measured in the ability of policing bodies to perform 
their role as safety and security providers, the 
SAPS in Khayelitsha has displayed major failures. 
In all Khayelitsha precincts, residents feel unsafe, 
especially at night, and feel particularly vulnerable to 
crimes such as robbery.4 
The commission of inquiry into policing in Khayelitsha 
offers a unique window into the challenges of 
implementing the community policing model, 
especially in a high crime, violent, unsafe, and 
relatively poor neighbourhood. As well as revealing 
significant inefficiencies within police stations, the 
commission’s report offers a detailed investigation 
and exposition of the external relations of the SAPS in 
Khayelitsha. Operating from August 2012 to August 
2014, the commission examined inefficiencies in the 
three police stations: Site B, Harare, and Lingelethu 
West, and the breakdown of relations between the 
SAPS and the community. 
Since the commission, the police in Khayelitsha 
(in the absence of directives from the national 
commissioner or minister of police)5 have been 
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engaging with the commission’s recommendations 
and seeking to ‘bridge’ certain policing gaps. This 
has manifested most prominently in the ‘Joints’ 
process, composed of SAPS station and cluster 
representatives, civil society organisations, local 
community and political leaders, and other police and 
government stakeholders. Composed of sub-forums 
on social and policing issues in Khayelitsha, including 
alcohol abuse, vigilantism, gender-based violence 
and transport safety, the Joints meets regularly. While 
these steps indicate responsiveness on the SAPS’s 
part, there have been problems, including poor 
attendance and participation,6 a lack of leadership 
within some forums, and a still-forming strategic 
plan.7 Nonetheless, these processes are ongoing and 
it is too early to analyse any potential outcomes. 
A further complication arose when, in August 2015, 
a number of contradictory responses by the SAPS 
leadership regarding the commission were made 
public. On 8 August, the National Commissioner, 
Riah Phiyega, was reported to have dismissed the 
commission and its findings, arguing that it was an 
‘expensive and resource-hungry paper exercise’.8 In 
contrast, on 24 August, Police Minister Nathi Nhleko 
and Western Cape Premier Helen Zille released a 
joint statement announcing a task team to engage 
with and implement the recommendations of the 
commission.9 Given these inconsistent messages 
coming from the ‘top’, the national police support 
for the Joints and other implementation initiatives is 
somewhat opaque. This leaves SAPS Khayelitsha 
having to engage with multiple layers of politics: 
from internal SAPS politics to provincial and national 
political dynamics (because the commission
propelled their work onto the national and media 
stages). This is, of course, in addition to the layers of 
complex local politics and policing challenges they 
face on a daily basis.
Though the commission has provided a wealth of 
information, its narrow remit, as Super has pointed 
out, meant that it focused on ‘police inefficiency’ 
rather than the broader socio-economic context of 
crime.10 In this article we provide a concise overview 
of the policing web11 in Khayelitsha.12 It is worth 
noting that we concentrate on just three of South 
Africa’s 1 100 police stations. While some of the 
problems faced by the SAPS in Khayelitsha may 
be widespread, insofar as they are a manifestation 
of problematic or restrictive national directives or 
policy, we have limited our focus to the Khayelitsha 
cases. The inter-web of police and community in 
every case will be determined by its specific context, 
history, community, and working relations. Indeed, 
this article can perhaps be generalised insofar as we 
show that a mapping or overview of police relations 
is a necessary first step in understanding the nature, 
severity and variation of policing challenges at the 
station level.
The article comprises three sections. Firstly, we 
briefly outline internal police structures in Khayelitsha. 
Secondly, we map the external organisations and 
bodies that have connections to SAPS Khayelitsha. 
Thirdly, we briefly assess the implications of this web 
of external and internal inter-workings. 
Internal structures
An individual SAPS police station typically has 
three working divisions: Visible Policing (VISPOL), 
Crime Investigation (Detective Branch) and the 
Support Services (see Figure 1). Additionally, Crime 
Intelligence is a hybrid or overarching body, which 
manages the horizontal inter-workings between 
VISPOL and Crime Investigation. Here, we will briefly 
chart the roles and duties of officers in each division. 
While there are some variations in performance 
across Khayelitsha’s three police stations, it is 
possible to combine them insofar as they face 
common inefficiencies and problems.
Visible policing 
Member officers of the VISPOL division are 
uniformed, and often at the frontline of police–public 
interactions. VISPOL members are responsible 
for running the Community Service Centre (CSC); 
managing police holding cells; conducting sector 
patrols; court security; firearm, liquor and second 
hand goods policing; and undertaking crime 
prevention activities.13 The commission found that 
CSCs – the main location of direct engagement 
between police and the community – created and 
extended poor relations. Public access to police 
services was hindered by the repeated failure to 
answer telephones. There was evidence of recurring 
instances where police officials either refused to 
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open case dockets for complainants or intentionally 
created obstacles to laying a charge. Given the 
function of crime statistics – as a reflection of police 
performance and police–public relations – there is 
a direct incentive to under-record crimes reported 
at CSC offices.14 A compounding factor preventing 
police work is that many trained VISPOL members 
spend much of their time on clerical tasks, such as 
certifying documents for members of the public.15 
Overall, there were complaints that officers are 
discourteous and unhelpful.16
With regard to sector policing, sector profiles were 
poorly compiled and patrols infrequent. SAPS 
members rarely conducted patrols of informal 
neighbourhoods (see Figure 2, where informal 
neighbourhoods in Khayelitsha are shaded in 
green). This was a reflection, the police claimed, 
of the inaccessibility of these areas, and a lack of 
knowledge about area layouts. Since the inquiry, 
Crime Intelligence has been updating sector 
profiles and pulling in community groups and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) to provide 
updated information, as well as adopting the map 
(on the next page) produced by Violence Prevention 
through Urban Upgrading (VPUU).17
Crime investigation 
The Detective Service Centre (DSC) tasks include 
screening dockets; interviewing complainants; 
managing crime scenes; collecting and recording 
evidence; and updating case dockets. Crucially, 
the commission revealed that many crimes are 
not properly investigated, and, in some cases, not 
at all. This is partially an outcome of consistent 
understaffing of the detective services in Khayelitsha. 
As a result, each investigative officer is forced to 
carry a huge case load. As Brigadier Dladla testified 
to the commission: ‘You know in the movies … you 
see a team descending to a crime scene, attending 
to a docket, but here you have a team of dockets 
Figure 1: Internal SAPS Khayelitsha police station structures
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descending on a detective.’18 Furthermore, the 
detective services failed to provide regular 
feedback to complainants, witnesses and bereaved 
family members. 
Crime intelligence 
Crime Intelligence is primarily responsible for 
establishing the precinct’s overall crime situation. 
Working with VISPOL and Detective Services, the unit 
should direct crime prevention and investigation. The 
commission revealed serious weaknesses in crime 
intelligence in Khayelitsha, with insufficient evidence 
of case linkage analysis, identification of hotspots, 
crime mapping, or fieldwork.19 As a result, the three 
police stations, according to De Kock, are ‘policing 
by chance and luck and clearly not [by] intelligence-
led policing’.20
Overall, all three policing divisions of Khayelitsha 
stations, the commission revealed, have significant 
inefficiencies, and report high rates of ‘unexplained 
absenteeism’.21 The shortcomings appear to be a 
result of a lack of professionalism and poor attitudes 
and, on the face of it, are easily preventable through 
improved management and discipline. However, 
and perhaps relatedly, many of these inefficiencies 
can similarly be attributed to the lack of resources – 
both personnel and physical assets such as police 
vans – available to the police stations in Khayelitsha. 
SAPS’s resource system, according to then Lieutenant 
General Lamoer, is ‘fundamentally irrational’, with high 
crime areas such as Khayelitsha receiving insufficient 
allocations.22 Similarly, other national level policies, 
such as the way in which station performance is 
measured (through crime statistics), creates perverse 
incentives, which can erode community relations. 
External structures
Apart from the intricate internal web of a Khayelitsha 
police station, its effective functioning is dependent 
on the relationships it maintains with a host of external 
bodies – where ‘external’ refers to bodies that do not 
form part of the immediate structures of an individual 
station (as shown in Figure 3). 
Source: VPUU, 2015.
Figure 2: Map of Khayelitsha
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Police forums
Cluster office
The Khayelitsha cluster contains the three Khayelitsha 
police stations, Macassar, Lwandle, Somerset West, 
Gordon’s Bay and Strand. As such, the cluster office 
faces challenges in overseeing police stations in a 
number of very different neighbourhoods. Importantly, 
there is great uncertainty about the role of the 
office within the cluster, because while it has ‘co-
coordinating and oversight’ functions on a day-to-day 
basis, these do not extend to operational authority. 
In other words, members of the cluster office, while 
presiding over members at station level, do not have 
the authority to provide operational directives, or to 
manage discipline issues.23 This reality diverges from 
national policy, where the cluster office is seen as 
having both oversight and operational powers. 
FCS Unit 
The Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual 
Offences (FCS) Unit has a mandate to investigate all 
crimes (other than murder) that involve child victims, 
inter-familial crimes of assault and attempted murder, 
and any sexual offences, including cases of rape and 
incest.24 When a victim enters a Khayelitsha police 
station, the procedure is to immediately contact the 
FCS unit (operating on a 24-hour basis), which sends 
an investigative officer to conduct an interview in a 
victim-friendly room.25
The commission highlighted serious operational 
issues within the Khayelitsha FCS Unit. Shortcomings 
identified included understaffing; low morale; a large 
backlog of cases; poor quality of investigations; and 
a lack of crime intelligence capacity.26 Specifically, the 
Khayelitsha Thuthuzela Care Centre, which assists 
victims of rape and assault, indicated that the police 
were not fulfilling their role satisfactorily. Dr Genine 
Josias, head of the centre, noted that police 
members of the FCS Unit were highly disorganised, 
poorly managed, failed to attend stakeholder 
meetings, and had a poor response rate to calls. She 
noted two disturbing cases, the first of which involved 
the SAPS ignoring her attempts to signal a serial 
rapist; the second where a number of forensic ‘rape 
kits’ were dumped by FCS investigating officers.27 
Overall, Khayelitsha had the ‘worst performing FCS 
unit’ in the province.28 
Figure 3: External institutional relations
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Metropolitan police and traffic police
Officers of the Cape Town Metropolitan Police 
have three primary functions: the policing of traffic 
laws; the enforcement of the city’s by-laws; and 
crime prevention.29 Metro police are responsible for 
patrolling high-risk crime areas, monitoring the City’s 
CCTV footage, and responding to emergency calls.30 
Criminal suspects arrested by Metro officers (who 
only have search and seizure powers) are handed 
over to the SAPS for investigation.31 In Khayelitsha, 
the traffic police work with the SAPS to manage 
traffic, especially around the N2 highway. However, 
the reach of other Metro police bodies in Khayelitsha 
is limited; for example, the specialised gang unit 
focuses its operations elsewhere in the Cape Flats.32 
Overall, ‘external’ police structures in Khayelitsha 
have insufficient presence, power and/or capacities. 
The serious institutional failings at the cluster and FCS 
levels have negative consequences on police station 
performance in Khayelitsha.
Oversight bodies
Western Cape Department of Community Safety
There has been a national-level ‘divergence of 
views’ between the SAPS and the Department of 
Community Safety (DoCS) regarding the power of 
DoCS as an oversight body. In effect, DoCS has 
been prevented from investigating police activity 
in Khayelitsha.33 The commission was important 
because it firmly established that the Constitution 
gives DoCS the right to oversight, including 
unannounced visits to CSCs.34 
Civilian Secretariat
The Civilian Secretariat for Police, established in its 
current form in 2011,35 became fully-fledged only in 
April 2014.36 In its oversight capacity, the Secretariat 
is responsible for developing and assessing the 
policies of the SAPS, their implementation, and at 
the provincial level, monitoring police–community 
relations.37 
Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID)
The IPID allows members of the public to lay a 
complaint against a member of the SAPS. Types 
of complaints that require mandatory investigation 
include any deaths or rapes that occur while the 
victim is in police custody; any deaths resulting from 
police action; complaints about the discharge of a 
police firearm by an officer; rape by a police officer 
(on or off duty); any complaints relating to torture or 
assault by a police officer; and any corruption-related 
complaints.38 The IPID can, where appropriate, make 
disciplinary recommendations. The commission 
revealed that only five out of the 67 complaints 
made to the IPID from the three police stations in 
Khayelitsha showed a ‘substantiated’ outcome, 
where the rest were classed as ‘unsubstantiated’, 
and not pursued. This raises questions about the 
ability of the IPID as an investigative body. It is also, 
to some extent, a reflection of solidarity among 
police officers, and an unwillingness to give evidence 
against colleagues.39 
In summary, while there are a number of oversight 
bodies that operate across Khayelitsha police 
stations, all face limitations; from restricted access, 
to infancy, to ineffective investigation. If we add in 
the SAPS cluster office, one has to wonder how and 
if these bodies – all with different yet overlapping 
oversight mandates – can, and do, ‘talk’ to one 
another and/or coordinate recommendations; and 
how, and who, the police stations must and can take 
instruction from. The independence of these bodies 
undoubtedly has merits, but without clear operational 
guidelines on the SAPS’s part, oversight bodies 
will remain limited in their capacity to affect on-the-
ground policing. 
Public services
Health services
The SAPS is one of the key role players in the 
government’s policy of ‘victim empowerment’, led 
by the Department of Social Development. Rather 
ambiguously, among a set of other principles, 
the SAPS is expected to ‘refer victims to support 
services’.40 The SAPS Victim Empowerment Service 
manual outlines that an officer who comes into 
contact with a victim of crime must ensure the safety 
of the victim, arrange medical assistance if necessary, 
and preserve any possible evidence from the medical 
practitioner/hospital/clinic.41 As the Khayelitsha 
Thuthuzela cases have shown, this set of actions is 
not always followed. 
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Another important health services actor for SAPS 
Khayelitsha is the Forensic Pathology Service (FPS). 
In situations where a victim has died of unnatural 
causes, the function of the unit is to inspect crime 
scenes and transport bodies of the deceased to 
the mortuary for autopsy. It is the responsibility of 
the SAPS to secure a crime scene, perform blood 
splatter analysis, and collect fingerprints. However, 
the commission heard that the FPS often found 
crime scenes insufficiently protected, allowing for 
contamination; and that investigating officers were 
often absent from crime scenes.42 
Given the importance of connections between SAPS 
police stations and health services – for victims in 
need of medical attention, and to aid investigations 
– it is vital that relations to these external structures 
are functional. Evidence from the commission 
suggests that the poor performances of the FCS Unit 
and Detective Services limited the SAPS’s ability to 
investigate crime and assist victims. 
Schools
Gangsterism, drugs and violence present major 
disturbances to the learning environment in 
Khayelitsha schools. Many children are inhibited 
from accessing education as they fear going to and 
from school and being in the classrooms. Teachers 
have expressed similar fears. School principals who 
testified drew attention to the fact that 
children bring weapons onto school premises to 
protect themselves.43 
A ‘Partnership Protocol’ between the Department 
of Basic Education and the SAPS commits both 
bodies to support and implement crime prevention 
programmes in schools.44 SAPS Khayelitsha has 
been involved in a variety of initiatives, including 
conducting random searches and walkabouts on 
school campuses, monitoring the movement of 
children to and from school, and attending strategy 
meetings. However, learners have found ways 
to overcome these obstacles, and gangsterism 
is still rife.45 Thus, while the working relationship 
between SAPS Khayelitsha and schools in the area 
is established and engaged, the broader problem 
of gangsterism prevents the police from managing 
crime in schools. Rather than a matter of internal, 
institutional failure, this is a manifestation of policing in 
an unsafe neighbourhood. 
Emergency services
The Emergency Medical Service (EMS) relies heavily 
on the SAPS in Khayelitsha because, in many 
circumstances, ambulances may not enter the 
neighbourhood without police backup. Emergency 
personnel have been subject to abuse, including 
stoning of ambulances, theft and aggressive 
behaviour.46 The need for the SAPS to ‘shadow’ 
emergency vehicles generates logistical challenges, 
and, once more, reflects the challenges of policing in 
an unsafe neighbourhood, where extra demands are 
placed on SAPS officers.
Justice mechanisms
Courts – Khayelitsha Magistrate’s Court 
Two Detective Court Case Officers (DCCOs) and 
four liaison officers are assigned by the SAPS to 
the Khayelitsha Magistrate’s Court (including the six 
district courts and four regional courts). The DDCOs 
– whose purpose is to monitor docket flows and 
communicate between prosecutors and investigating 
officers47 – are possibly the only explicit and full-
time SAPS positions where inter-connections to an 
external body form the primary function of officers’ 
work. In spite of this, the commission revealed, 
prosecutors found case dockets missing, resulting 
in cases being struck off the role.48 In addition, 
highlighting the limits of detective work (including 
insufficient coordination with the Metro Police), the 
commission found that despite the presence of City 
CCTV cameras, none had ever been used as part of 
SAPS investigations. 
Community relations
The adoption of a community-centred strategy for 
policing was pivotal to the SAPS’s post-apartheid 
reform. The underlying assumption is that through 
a collaborative process, police and community 
members are better equipped to identify policing 
needs specific to their area.50 However, given 
the history of formal policing in Khayelitsha (or 
lack thereof), establishing community relations 
is particularly challenging and important. The 
commission identified a number of pre-established 
and operational alternative, informal forms of policing 
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in Khayelitsha. These – often enacted through 
politically affiliated street committees and taxi 
associations – are, in some ways, in direct opposition 
to the SAPS. 
Community policing forums (CPFs)
CPFs represent the structured forum wherein 
police officials consult with community members. 
Each precinct has a corresponding CPF headed 
by the station commander.51 The purposes of the 
CPF are to develop problem-solving strategies for 
addressing crime, and to improve the transparency 
and accountability of the police.52 However, CPFs in 
Khayelitsha have not been successful in establishing 
a strong partnership between the SAPS and the 
community. A survey of residents found that less than 
half of the participants were even aware of CPFs, 
and of those, only around 20% had any involvement 
in them. Community members who attended CPF 
meetings expressed frustration that they were 
unproductive and tended to be politically dominated 
(as discussed below).53 
Neighbourhood watches
Neighbourhood watches in Khayelitsha are funded 
by DoCS, and managed by the VPUU. Volunteers 
patrol neighbourhoods, and police officers are meant 
to provide support, including accompanying patrols. 
However, the commission found that SAPS members 
rarely joined patrols, nor did they provide crime- 
and safety-related information.54 In some cases, 
neighbourhood watches had not been accepted by 
the street committees working in the area and had 
faced assault.55 
Civil society groups
There are numerous civil society bodies and NGOs 
that operate in Khayelitsha. A list of role players 
includes the Khayelitsha Development Forum 
(KDF); taxi associations (CODESA being the most 
prominent); the South African National Civics 
Organisation (SANCO); the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU), and faith-based 
organisations.56 The Khayelitsha Commission itself 
was established after complaints were laid by a group 
of NGOs comprising the Social Justice Coalition 
(SJC), Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), Equal 
Education, Triangle Project and Ndifuna Ukwazi.57
The relationships of civic bodies to SAPS Khayelitsha 
vary greatly, as does their respective power in the 
community. In Khayelitsha, the ANC-aligned KDF 
and SANCO are particularly powerful, and often 
come into opposition with Democratic Alliance (DA) 
supporters and organisations associated with the DA. 
Both SANCO and KDF have, for example, dominated 
CPFs.58 Together, they operate as gatekeepers of 
safety or ‘informal justice’. Street committees, for 
example, are seen as ‘belonging’ to SANCO, and 
have operated (from apartheid until today) largely 
outside the remit of the SAPS. SANCO has also 
been connected to taxi associations that ‘deal’ with 
youth gangs.59 The KDF sees itself as the party that 
‘should address … violent service delivery protests’, 
rather than CPFs or the SAPS.60 Interestingly, and 
highlighting their political influence, all ward councillors 
in Khayelitsha serve ex officio on the KDF.61 The SAPS 
has to continually engage with SANCO and the KDF, 
and needs their support in order to function. Yet many 
of SANCO and the KDF’s operations deliberately 
circumvent SAPS–community structures. This 
creates complex political challenges for the SAPS in 
Khayelitsha, and the power of these organisations 
within the community can block police work and 
broader community engagement. Even in the Joints, 
post-commission processes, this pattern remains 
troublesome. While some civil society organisations 
are heavily engaged in the Joints, others remain 
absent. Interestingly, Ndifuna Ukwazi and the SJC are 
particularly active in the Joints, whereas the KDF and 
SANCO lack representation.62 The absence of key civil 
society stakeholders raises questions about the reach 
and potential effectiveness of the Joints.
Local businesses
Business crime in Khayelitsha is significant, with 
foreign (especially Somali) owned spaza shops being 
particularly targeted, as well as formal businesses 
in Khayelitsha Mall.63 One of the challenges of 
preventing and prosecuting business (and general) 
crime in Khayelitsha is the lack of shop and private 
CCTV cameras. Policing in richer areas is aided 
by collaborative partnerships with businesses and 
individuals who have their own security and/or 
CCTV technology, which they share with SAPS for 
crime investigations. 
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Overall, informal community networks that work 
to manage crime in Khayelitsha are at odds with 
formal police structures. These bodies can come to 
use non-legal, informal means of ‘justice’, including 
vigilantism.64  Given the SAPS’s poor performance 
in Khayelitsha, these alternative mechanisms for 
policing dominate, and even inhibit the police 
from developing positive community relations. The 
police–public cycle thus becomes self-reinforcing 
and perpetuated. This presents a vital challenge for 
SAPS police stations in Khayelitsha, and one that is 
not easily overcome. 
Implications
From the mapping, it becomes clear that policing 
challenges are a reflection, broadly speaking, of both 
context and internal SAPS structuring. 
Inefficiencies are caused by poor police station 
performance and by institutional problems at 
the cluster and national levels. Given the highly 
centralised nature of the SAPS, universal policies 
– notably resource allocation – do not always 
accommodate situations on the ground, or provide 
equal service. Within the SAPS, problematic 
institutional policing cultures have developed. For 
example, the sentiment that ‘cowboys don’t cry’ 
– the idea that ‘strong’ police officers do not need 
to undergo counselling and debriefing measures 
despite being exposed to a great deal of violence 
and trauma – is especially troubling in high crime 
neighbourhoods like Khayelitsha.65 In addition, the 
poor behaviour of some highly ranked police officers 
has created organisational contradictions. On the 
one hand, the SAPS prides itself on integrity. On 
the other hand, there have been multiple reports 
of corruption in the organisation and a marked 
lack of strong, respectable leadership.66 This may 
create ‘institutional confusion’, and compromise the 
behaviour of lower ranked officers. 
Furthermore, within the SAPS there is a lack of 
provision for establishing external relations. With 
the exception of DCCOs, there are no station-
level positions that focus on creating effective 
external inter-workings. The problem is, of course, 
compounded by the highly centralised, militarised 
and strictly confined organisational processes of the 
SAPS.67 These institutional operating procedures 
may differ from external but related bodies.68 For 
example, a medical professional’s Hippocratic Oath 
may, at times, be at odds with a police officer’s 
mandate to investigate and prevent crime. The 
SAPS’s lack of operational ability to ‘talk’ to and 
function with external bodies limits the possibilities of 
community policing. 
The station-level mapping also illustrates that in high 
crime, relatively poor neighbourhoods, extra demands 
are placed on the police. From patrolling schools, 
to shadowing ambulances, to providing clerical 
services to the public, to investigating crime without 
community resources such as CCTV cameras, SAPS 
Khayelitsha has multiple additional burdens on top of 
high crime rates and corresponding high case levels. 
Conclusion
While this article is predominantly descriptive, we 
argue that only by mapping SAPS Khayelitsha’s 
policing web can we come to recognise the 
complexities of policing. The nature and inter-
workings of the police in relation to external bodies, 
and internally, will vary according to context. While 
Khayelitsha presents a challenging context, the 
commission revealed that the degrees and types 
of under-performance of SAPS police stations in 
Khayelitsha were unacceptable. Given the distrust 
of the police, as indicated through the lack of 
community participation in CPFs and Joints forums, 
it is vital the police understand and make efforts 
to address poor community relations. It is similarly 
important that analysts appreciate the complex 
socio-political and organisational webs that the SAPS 
has to interact with. Thus, we contend, creating 
overviews of station-level police networks is a useful 
and necessary exercise in understanding on-the-
ground policing. 
To comment on this article visit 
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
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